This Strategy is Not Working (2006)

Two years after standing before a banner that read “mission accomplished,” George W. Bush’s war in Iraq dragged on. Military officials and intelligence analysts warned of a growing insurgency as early as late 2003. Others hoped political developments would slowly, but surely, overtake opposition, bringing peace and stability to the country.

Mixed signals abounded for any who sought to predict Iraq’s future. Sectarian violence spiked anew by the summer of 2005, especially in Baghdad, and with particular barbarity. Political milestones also dotted the landscape, including November’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” the White House’s effort to shore-up bipartisan support for the war through a clearer explanation of US policy in Iraq. We plan to “clear, hold, and build,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told Congress.  Nation-wide elections in December suggesting improved governance in Iraq might yet, she and other administration officials hoped, drain the current wave of violence of momentum.

American commanders in Iraq, and Defense Department officials in Washington, disagreed with Rice’s optimistic characterization, revealing that American strategy was anything but agreed upon in Washington.